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NOTES
The Intentional-Tort Exception to the Workers' Compensation
Exclusive Remedy Immunity Provision: Woodson v. Rowland
On September 3, 1991, a tragedy struck at the Imperial Food Prod-
ucts chicken processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina. Inside the
plant a hydraulic line ruptured and poured flammable fluid onto the nat-
ural gas flames that heated the plant's chicken fryers. The fire spread
rapidly and enveloped the plant in heavy smoke. Several of the exit
doors were either locked or blocked, preventing the employees from es-
caping. Twenty-five workers died; over fifty were injured.' In the after-
math of the fire, government officials accused Imperial Food of
misconduct, alleging safety and fire code violations and dangerous work-
ing conditions at the Hamlet plant.2 For the injured and dead employees
and their families, as for most employees in North Carolina, the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act3 (the Act) provides certain modest
statutory benefits; those limited benefits, however, unlike a tort recovery,
do not and are not intended to compensate fully these individuals for
their loss.4 Accordingly, two major, related issues arise: (1) whether
North Carolina law limits compensation for the Imperial Food workers
to the benefits offered by the Workers' Compensation Act, or alterna-
1. Most of the deaths resulted from smoke inhalation. Julie P. Rives & Tom Mather, 49
Injured as Doors Bar Safety Routes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 4, 1991, at Al,
A7. The death toll was the highest recorded in a North Carolina workplace accident since the
state began keeping records in 1970. Id. at Al. Initial estimates that 45 workers had been
injured quickly increased to over 50. Pamela Babcock & Julie P. Rives, Families Say 25 Died
Needlessly; Locked Exit Confirmed, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 5, 1991, at Al,
A15.
2. A report prepared by the Fire and Rescue Services Division of the North Carolina
Department of Insurance revealed that the plant had no sprinkler system or fire evacuation
plan; that no exit in the building met state building codes; that at least two exits were locked
and several others were bolted from the outside, blocked by freezers, or locked; and finally that
one door labeled "Fire Door" remained locked. Pamela Babcock, Imperial "Violated Every
Code," NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 7, 1991, at Al, A9.
Imperial Food workers described conditions at the plant as "deplorable." Babcock &
Rives, supra note 1, at A15. According to some witnesses, the plant "smelled like a hog pen,"
the floors were slick with grease, and when employees slipped and fell on loose chicken parts,
management discouraged them from seeking treatment. Id. One worker stated that when he
and his fellow workers periodically detected the odor of gas in the room, management in-
structed the employees to continue working. Id. Doors stayed locked, the workers explained,
to prevent workers or others from stealing chickens. Rives & Mather, supra note 1, at A7.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1991).
4. For a discussion of the purposes of the workers' compensation system and the'benefits
provided under the Act, see infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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tively permits pursuit of tort claims against Imperial Food; and (2)
whether an employee must relinquish all rights to workers' compensation
benefits if he brings a common-law tort action. With its landmark deci-
sion in Woodson v. Rowland 5 rendered barely two weeks prior to the
tragedy in Hamlet, the North Carolina Supreme Court may well have
changed the answers to these questions.
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the state's workers'
compensation system in 19296 to give employers and employees a fair
and efficient method for handling job-related accidents. The workers'
compensation scheme codified a trade-off: a worker injured on the job
could no longer sue the employer; instead, the worker's sole recourse was
to bring a claim under the statute, but he was guaranteed a recovery
without having to prove fault.' The North Carolina Supreme Court
eventually created an exception to the Act's exclusivity: when an em-
ployer deliberately injures his employee, the employee may seek the more
liberal measure of damages available at common law.' The employee's
choice of remedies, however, constitutes a binding election.9
In Woodson the supreme court expanded the exception for inten-
tional misconduct by lowering the level of intent required to strip an
employer of tort immunity under the Act. Rather than an actual, delib-
erate intent to injure the employee, the court held, misconduct that the
employer knows is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death is
sufficient to expose the employer to tort liability. 10 The court held fur-
ther that when an employer exhibits the requisite intent, an employee
may pursue statutory and common-law remedies simultaneously. 1 The
5. 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
6. See North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1991)). For a discussion of the
development of workers' compensation statutes, see infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the quid pro quo inherent in the workers' compensation system
and the historical factors that prompted the enactment of such statutes, see infra notes 67-78
and accompanying text.
8. See Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210-11, 60 S.E.2d 106, 113-14 (1950)
(embracing the general rule that the statute does not protect employers who deliberately as-
sault their employees); see also infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text (discussing Essick
and related cases).
9. Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 733, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952) (quoting SAMUEL B.
HORovrrz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 336 (1944)),
overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and
overruled inpart by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233; Essick, 232 N.C. at 210-11,
60 S.E.2d at 113-14 (quoting HOROVlTZ, supra, at 336).
10. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228; see infra notes 43-50 and accompa-
nying text.




goals of protecting the employee, promoting a safe work environment,
and deterring employer misconduct formed the bases of the court's
decision. 2
This Note discusses the Woodson decision in light of the history and
development of workers' compensation systems in the United States and
in North Carolina. It recounts the judicial creation in North Carolina of
an intentional-tort exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensa-
tion remedy,13 examining the level of intent a plaintiff must show to es-
tablish an intentional tort and the necessity of an employee's election of
remedies if intentional misconduct exists. 4 The Note next considers the
potential impact of Woodson. It analyzes how the court applied the sub-
stantial-certainty standard to the facts before it and questions how this
application may affect subsequent interpretations of the standard. It dis-
cusses the ramifications of the Woodson decision for both employees and
employers. The Note concludes that, although the court's decision can
be justified as sound social policy, it represents a modification of the bal-
ance of interests originally incorporated into North Carolina's workers'
compensation statute. The Note suggests that the legislature is the
proper body to address such fundamental changes and offers alternatives
for revising the statute to protect the interests of both employers and
employees.
Pinnacle One Associates, a developer, hired Davidson & Jones, Inc.
as general contractor on one of its construction projects." Davidson &
Jones in turn retained Morris Rowland Utility, Inc. as subcontractor to
dig a sanitary sewer line for the project.16 Thomas Sprouse, who was
employed by Rowland Utility as part of a crew digging trenches for the
sewer line, died when the trench in which he was working caved in.' 7
On the day before the cave-in, crews from both Davidson & Jones
and Rowland Utility arrived to dig trenches for the sewer line.' 8 David-
son & Jones's foreman, Lynn Craig, refused to permit his crew to work in
the trenches, which were not properly sloped, braced, or shored, and also
were not equipped with a trench box, as required by the North Carolina
12. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
13. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
14. Woodson also involved claims relating to nondelegable duties and negligent hiring
against the developer and general contractor who hired the employer. See infra note 28. This
Note does not address these issues, and reference to those aspects of the decision will be made
only for purposes of clarity.
15. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 334, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 334, 407 S.E.2d at 224-25.
18. Id. at 334-35, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
1992]
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Occupational Safety and Health Act.19 At Craig's request, Morris Row-
land, president of Rowland Utility, procured a trench box for the David-
son & Jones workers.20 He did not, however, provide a trench box for
his own crew.21 Equipped with the trench box, the Davidson & Jones
crew began work.22
The following day, Rowland Utility's crew continued to work in the
trenches.23 The Davidson & Jones crew did not work that day, leaving
the trench box they had used available for Rowland Utility's workers.
Morris Rowland, however, chose not to use the box.24 At approximately
9:30 A.M., one side of the trench collapsed, completely burying Sprouse
and covering the man next to him up to the armpits.2" Sprouse died
before his fellow workers could free him.26
The administratrix of Sprouse's estate brought a civil action under
North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act2 7 against Rowland Utility, Morris
Rowland, Davidson & Jones, and Pinnacle One.28 The administratrix
maintained that Rowland Utility's violations of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act constituted conduct so grossly negligent that it
amounted to an intentional assault on Sprouse, thereby stripping Row-
land Utility of its immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act.29
19. Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225. Lynn Craig testified that the trench "could have been a
little safer," and that he believed a trench box would best protect his workers. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Rowland Utility had been cited four times in the previous six years for violating
safety procedures for trenching operations. Id. at 335 n.1, 407 S.E.2d at 225 n.l.
22. Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225. The crews used a backhoe to dig the trenches and then
laid the pipe. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 225. A front-end loader followed the men's progress by
driving along the edge of the trench behind the workers, dumping gravel onto the newly laid
pipe. Id.
23. Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225. Sprouse worked in the trench at the point closest to the
front-end loader. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 225.
24. Id. at 335, 407 S.E.2d at 225. Rowland testified that he discussed whether to use the
trench box with the project supervisor, but that he believed the trench was safe, and that the
packed soil would not collapse. Id.
25. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 225-26. The crew pulled the partially buried man from the
trench and took him to the hospital, while the remaining workers attempted to uncover
Sprouse. Id. at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
26. Id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
28. Plaintiff contended that Davidson & Jones breached a nondelegable duty by allowing
Rowland Utility negligently to perform an inherently dangerous activity, namely trench exca-
vation. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 44, 373 S.E.2d 674, 678 (1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). Plaintiff further maintained that Da-
vidson & Jones negligently hired and retained Rowland Utility as subcontractor. Id. at 45, 373
S.E.2d at 678.
29. Id. at 41, 373 S.E.2d at 676. Sprouse's administratrix also contended that Morris
Rowland was acting in his capacity as co-employee to Sprouse, rather than as employer,
thereby taking the case outside the purview of the Act. Id. at 44, 373 S.E.2d at 677.
Vol. 70
1992] N.C. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 853
The trial court rejected this argument and granted each defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment; the plaintiff appealed from these rulings.30
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment to Rowland Utility.3' The court held that
although merely filing a worker's compensation claim does not constitute
an election of remedies, the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act barred plaintiff's action.32 The court of appeals reasoned
that Rowland Utility's actions, albeit grossly negligent, did not rise to the
30. Id. at 39, 373 S.E.2d at 675.
31. Id. at 40-43, 373 S.E.2d at 675-77. The court of appeals also held that summary
judgment with regard to the claims against Morris Rowland individually, Davidson & Jones,
and Pinnacle One was proper. Id. at 44-48, 373 S.E.2d at 677-80. Judge Phillips dissented
with respect to the dismissal of the claims against Davidson & Jones, maintaining that David-
son & Jones was under a duty to eliminate the hazard created by its subcontractor. Id. at 49-
50, 373 S.E.2d at 680-81 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The court held that Morris Rowland was the alter ego of Rowland Utility and conse-
quently was entitled to the same immunity as that granted to employers pursuant to § 97-10.1
of the Act. Id. at 44, 373 S.E.2d at 677-78; see infra note 32 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-10.1 (1991)). Judge Phillips concurred in the majority's dismissal of the claims against
Morris Rowland, but found aspects of the opinion "incorrect[] and unduly broad." Woodson
v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 48, 373 S.E.2d 674, 680 (1988) (Phillips, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
First, he maintained that dismissal was warranted not simply because Morris Rowland owned
and controlled the corporate employer, but because the duty allegedly attributed by plaintiff to
him individually constituted instead a nondelegable duty owed by the corporate employer to
its employees. Id. at 48-49, 373 S.E.2d at 680 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Second, the corporate exclusivity provision set forth in § 97-10.1 applies only to an
employee's claim against the employer, not to third parties. Thus, holding that Morris Row-
land had violated a duty to Sprouse as a co-employee would not negate the Act's exclusivity
provision. Id. (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Phillips, however, failed to address the fact that §§ 97-9 and 97-10.1 of the Act
must be construed together, so that the Act's exclusivity under § 97-10.1 is extended to em-
ployees as well as to employers; see infra note 32.
32. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 40-43, 373 S.E.2d 674, 675-77 (1988), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991). Section 97-10.1 provides that
when an injury or death is compensable under the Act, the statutory benefits constitute an
employee's sole recourse. Specifically, § 97-10.1 states that:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the
provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the em-
ployee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as
against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or
death.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1.
North Carolina courts have held that the exclusivity provision of § 97-10.1 must be read
in conjunction with similar language included in § 97-9 referring to the obligation and liabili-
ties of employers under the Act. See Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d
106, 113 (1950) (holding that contradictions and inequities would result unless "the immunity
given in Section 97-9 [is] ... carried through the provisions of Section 97-10"); infra notes 85-
86 and accompanying text. Section 97-9 provides:
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level of intentional conduct, and thus were not excepted from the Act's
exclusivity provisions.33 The court acknowledged that in Pleasant v.
Johnson 34 the North Carolina Supreme Court had equated willful, wan-
ton, and reckless negligence with an intentional injury in a personal in-
jury claim between co-employees, but maintained that to extend this
reasoning to employers' conduct would skew the "delicate balance estab-
lished by the Act."3 Such action, the court stated, is "more properly a
legislative prerogative than a judicial function."36 Thus, the court held
that plaintiff's sole recourse was to pursue her claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits under the Act. That she had received no workers'
compensation benefits was irrelevant, stated the court; since her exclusive
remedy lay in the Act's statutory benefits, she had no right to select an-
other remedy.37 The court of appeals' decision, therefore, comported
with prior decisions limiting an injured employee's remedy against the
employer to statutory benefits when the employer did not deliberately
intend to injure the employee.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Article shall se-
cure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided; and while such security remains in force, he or those conducting his business
shall only be liable to any employee for personal injury or death by accident to the
extent and in the manner herein specified.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9. Thus, the employer's immunity from tort actions at common law
also extends to employees "conducting [the employer's] business" under § 97-9.
The North Carolina Supreme Court created an exception to the exclusivity provision to
cover intentional torts committed by an employer against its employees or by a co-employee.
See Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 733-34, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952), overruled in part by Pleas-
ant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and overruled in part by Wood-
son, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233; Essick, 232 N.C. at 210-11, 60 S.E.2d at 113-14. For
further discussion of this exception and its development, see infra notes 82-138 and accompa-
nying text.
33. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 42, 373 S.E.2d 674, 676-77 (1988), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
34. 312 N.C. 710, 717, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985) (holding that willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct by a co-employee constitutes an intentional injury and strips him of tort
immunity under the Act). For a discussion of this aspect of the holding in Pleasant, see infra
notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
35. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 42, 373 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991)
36. Id. at 42, 373 S.E.2d at 677.
37. Id. at 43, 373 S.E.2d at 677. The court cited as authority for this decision the supreme
court's holdings in Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 510, 340 S.E.2d 295, 302
(1986) (plurality opinion), overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233,
and Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294, 295-96, 316 S.E.2d 81, 82 (1984). For a discussion
of the holdings of these cases and the doctrine of election of remedies, see infra notes 162-227
and accompanying text.
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decision and the trial court's summary judgment against the plaintiff."3
In doing so, the court announced two major holdings with respect to an
employer's intentional conduct as it relates to the exclusivity and immu-
nity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. First, the court held
that when an employee is killed or injured as a result of employer mis-
conduct that the employer knows is substantially certain to cause serious
injury or death, such conduct is tantamount to an intentional tort,39 and
the employee or his personal representative may pursue a civil action
against the employer.' Second, the court decided that a plaintiff need
not choose between a workers' compensation claim or a civil action
under these facts, but instead may pursue both, because the employee's
death or injury results both from an "accident" as that term is defined
under the Act41 and from an intentional tort.42
As to the issue of the employer's conduct, the court began its analy-
sis by asserting that the Workers' Compensation Act should be inter-
preted in light of the legislative purpose behind the statute.43 Chief
Justice Exum, writing for the majority, stated that shielding an employer
from civil liability for intentional torts that result in injury or death to
38. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 360, 407 S.E.2d at 240. The court also reversed the appellate
court as to the summary judgment motions in favor of Morris Rowland, affirmed the lower
courts' rulings as to Pinnacle One and Davidson & Jones on the negligent hiring and retention
claims, and reversed as to plaintiff's claim against Davidson & Jones based on breach of a
nondelegable duty. Id.
39. This standard is applied to intentional torts in common-law tort actions. A leading
commentator has defined intent in the context of intentional torts as "broader than a desire or
purpose to bring about physical results. It extends not only to those consequences which are
desired, but also to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from what
the actor does." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984). Intent "extends not only to having in the mind... a desire to bring
about given consequences but also to having in mind knowledge that given consequences are
substantially certain to result from the act." Id. at 34 (parentheses omitted); accord RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A & cmt. b (1965) ("As the probability that the consequences
will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses the
character of intent .... "). The Woodson court adopted the dissenting opinion in Barrino, 315
N.C. at 517-22, 340 S.E.2d at 305-08 (Martin, J., dissenting). Woodson, 329 N.C. at 340, 407
S.E.2d at 228. For a discussion of Justice Martin's rationale in Barrino, see infra notes 114-20
and accompanying text.
40. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
41. The courts have defined an "accident" for purposes of workers' compensation claims
as "an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the injured
employee.., a result produced by a fortuitous cause." Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co.,
256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962); accord Rinehart v. Roberts Super Mkt.,
Inc., 271 N.C. 586, 588, 157 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1967).
42. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
43. Id. at 338, 407 S.E.2d at 227. For a discussion of the purposes and trade-offs inherent
in the workers' compensation system, see infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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employees does not reinforce that legislative purpose.44 Chief Justice
Exum noted that North Carolina recognizes the doctrine of constructive
intent,45 pointing to Pleasant v. Johnson,"4 a decision that relied in part
on that doctrine, and concluded that actual intent to cause injury is not
an essential element of intentional tort claims based on work-related inju-
ries caused by co-employees. 7 Acknowledging that the rationale for
holding co-employees civilly liable for their willful, wanton, and reckless
conduct is not equally applicable to employers, Chief Justice Exum de-
clined to adopt the Pleasant standard.48 He reasoned that the higher
threshold of "substantial certainty" both satisfies the legislative purpose
in enacting the workers' compensation statute by maintaining the bal-
ance of trade-offs and compromises between employers and employees,
and furthers the stated legislative goal of promoting safety in the work-
place4 9 by deterring intentional wrongdoing.50
Justice Mitchell dissented from the majority's holding on this is-
sue," approving instead the reasoning of the court of appeals that per-
mitting an employee to bring a tort action against his employer "'even
for gross, willful and wanton negligence, would skew the balance of inter-
ests'" of the workers' compensation system.5 2 Changes in this balance,
Justice Mitchell asserted, should come from the General Assembly, not
44. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227.
45. Id at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. For a definition of constructive intent, see infra text
accompanying note 95.
46. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
47. Id. at 715-16, 325 S.E.2d at 248-49. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in
Pleasant, see infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
48. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. For a discussion of the factors outlined
in Pleasant, see infra notes 107-10, 183-87, and accompanying text.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(b)(2) (1989). The pertinent provisions of this section are
set forth infra note 119.
50. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
51. Id at 361, 407 S.E.2d at 240 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Meyer joined in this concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Justice Mitchell had no quarrel with the majority's upholding of summary judgment in
favor of Pinnacle One. Id. at 361, 407 S.E.2d at 240 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He also concurred in the court's holding that Davidson & Jones could not
be liable for its negligent hiring and retention of Rowland Utility. Id. (Mitchell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). He argued, however, that the court also should have upheld
summary judgment for Davidson & Jones on the nondelegable duty claim, observing that exca-
vating was not an inherently dangerous activity. Id. at 361-62, 407 S.E.2d at 240-41 (Mitchell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 362, 407 S.E.2d at 241 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 42, 373 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991)). See supra notes 32-37 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the appellate court's reasoning on this issue.
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the courts.53
In applying the "substantial certainty" standard to the facts of the
case, the court imputed to Rowland Utility the conduct of Morris Row-
land as chief executive officer.5 4 Plaintiff's evidence indicated that the
trench, as constructed by Rowland Utility, was substantially certain to
collapse,55 and that Morris Rowland knew of this substantial certainty.56
Since the court concluded that a juror could reasonably determine from
the evidence that there existed a substantial certainty both that the
trench would collapse and that Morris Rowland knew this would hap-
pen, the court found that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.5 7
The court's second major holding in Woodson concerned the plain-
tiff's election of remedies. The court found that when an employee
brings an action at law against his employer on an intentional-tort the-
ory, he need not elect between the remedies available at common law and
those provided under the Workers' Compensation Act. 8 Since the Act
53. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 362, 407 S.E.2d at 241 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 344-45, 407 S.E.2d at 231. The court noted that a corporation can act only
through its agents, including its officers. Id. at 344, 407 S.E.2d at 231 (citing Raper v. Mc-
Crory-McLellan Corp., 259 N.C. 199, 205, 130 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1963)).
55. Plaintiff's expert in soil and environmental analysis concluded that, based on the
physical conditions of the soil and the character of the trench (which consisted of 14-foot high
vertical walls), the trench "'had an exceedingly high probability of failure, and the trench was
substantially certain to fail.' "Id. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231 (quoting Affidavit of James Rees).
56. Id. The evidence revealed that Morris Rowland had considerable experience in exca-
vating different types of soil, that he knew the risks inherent in this type of work, and that he
had been cited four times in the past six and a half years for violating trenching and safety
regulations. Id. The plaintiff's evidence showed that Rowland was present at the site on the
day Sprouse was killed and was therefore aware of the conditions in the trenches. Id. at 345-
46, 407 S.E.2d at 231. Further, Davidson & Jones's foreman had indicated that, in his opinion,
the trench was unsafe. Id. at 345, 407 S.E.2d at 231. Despite this, Rowland disregarded the
clear danger and directed work to proceed without any safety precautions. Id The court
noted that Rowland's desire that work proceed at as fast a pace as possible might have been a
motive for his decision to disregard the dangers. Id.
57. Id. at 346, 407 S.E.2d at 231-32. As for Morris Rowland's individual liability, the
court held that because he was at all relevant times the president and sole shareholder and was
acting in furtherance of the corporation's business, his individual tort liability must be
grounded on the same principles as that of his employer. Id. at 347, 407 S.E.2d at 232. Chief
Justice Exum cited cases from other jurisdictions that held that corporate officers and directors
cannot be held civilly liable when the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions shielded
their corporate employers. Id. Hence, by implication, when the corporate employer may be
held liable if the plaintiff establishes that the employer knew with substantial certainty that
serious injury or death would result from its intentional conduct, so the corporate officer may
be held individually liable by applying the same standard. See id. at 347-48, 407 S.E.2d at 232.
58. Id. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233. For a discussion of the election-of-remedies doctrine in
workers' compensation actions, both with regard to employers' and co-employees' claims, see
infra notes 162-210 and accompanying text.
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defines an "accident" from the perspective of the employee,59 and the
employee does not expect intentional torts to be committed against him,
the employee may treat such injuries as accidents compensable under the
Act." At the same time, the employee may allege that the behavior in
question constituted an intentional tort and seek remedies outside the
Act.61 To assert both positions, the court maintained, is not inherently
inconsistent with the goal of the election-of-remedies doctrine-to pre-
vent double recovery for a single wrong.62 Chief Justice Exum, however,
emphasized that a worker is entitled to but one recovery, and suggested
that the court avoid double recovery by requiring reimbursement to the
employer's insurance carrier of any amount paid under workers' com-
pensation or by subrogating the employee's claim to the extent of work-
ers' compensations benefits paid.63
The court observed further that its refusal to require an election
rested on equitable grounds." If forced to choose, an employee in finan-
cial difficulty will likely feel compelled to accept lower workers' compen-
sation benefits rather than pursue a potentially higher, yet riskier, tort
award, even if he believes he has a valid common-law claim. The penuri-
ous employee cannot be said to have made a "choice" between two
remedies.65
To assess properly the impact of Woodson, it is important to under-
stand the legislative purpose behind the Workers' Compensation Act, the
development of the Act's exclusivity provision, and the recognized excep-
tions to that provision. By looking at the reasons for relinquishing rights
in the workers' compensation system, 66 one can better determine the ex-
tent to which Woodson alters the balances created by the Act.
At the beginning of this century, laborers, who had flocked to fac-
tory jobs in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, suffered serious work-
59. See supra note 41.
60. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
61. Id.
62. Id. For a discussion of the basic tenets of the election-of-remedies doctrine, see infra
notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
63. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. Subrogation can be accomplished
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(0 (1991). See infra note 110.
64. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349-50, 407 S.E.2d at 233-34. The court relied on the analysis
in Justice Martin's dissenting opinion in Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 521-
22, 340 S.E.2d 295, 307-08 (1986) (Martin J., dissenting), overruled in part by Woodson, 329
N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. For a discussion of Justice Martin's reasoning, see infra notes
203-10 and accompanying text.
65. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349-50, 407 S.E.2d at 234 (quoting Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522,
340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting)).
66. For a discussion of the rights given up by both groups, see infra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text.
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related injuries that typically went uncompensated. 67 Although an em-
ployee could sue his employer at common law, he was seldom successful,
due in large part to the protection afforded employers by three common-
law defenses--contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fel-
low-servant rule.68 Employees, compelled by limited financial resources
and the time required to pursue a tort recovery, accepted settlements that
often were woefully inadequate to compensate their injuries.69 Thus, the
employee bore a disproportionate share of the burden of work-related
accidents.
In response to the laborers' plight, state legislatures began enacting
workers' compensation statutes in the first years of the twentieth cen-
tury.70 North Carolina promulgated its Workers' Compensation Act in
1929.71 Like other states, North Carolina based its workers' compensa-
tion system on an enterprise liability theory:7 2 the costs of accidental
work-related injuries should be treated as overhead, absorbed into the
price of the product, and ultimately passed along to the consumer.73
67. KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 80, at 572 & n.43.1; 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.00, at 23 (1990); id. § 4.50, at 32; id. § 5.20, at 37.
68. KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 80, at 569-72 (describing defenses); 1 LARSON, supra
note 67, § 4.30, at 25-28 (same). The courts required workers to exercise reasonable care for
their own safety, and their own negligence (no matter how slight) would completely bar their
recovery. KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 80, at 569-70. Further, the employee was said to
have assumed the risk of hazards normally found in the workplace, against which employers
had no duty to protect workers. If a worker knew of a dangerous condition and voluntarily
remained, he was said to have accepted the risk of injury. Id. at 570-71. The fellow-servant
rule, an exception to the general rule of vicarious liability, stated that an employer was not
liable for injuries caused solely by a coworker's negligence (another hazard for which employ-
ees were said to have assumed the risk). Id. at 571.
69. KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 80, at 572-73 & n.44.
70. The push for workers' compensation laws began in Europe. 1 LARSON, supra note 67,
§ 5.10, at 33-35. By 1920 all but eight states in the United States had workers' compensation
statutes. Id. § 5.30, at 39.
71. See North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1991)).
72. 1 LARSON, supra note 67, § 2.20, at 6-7; id. § 3.20, at 17-18. Workers' compensation
is a no-fault system. The employer pays insurance premiums: when an employee is injured in
a work-related accident that arises out of and in the course of his employment, he automati-
cally receives compensation benefits under the statutory scheme, without regard for his own or
his employer's negligence. Id. § 1.10, at 1-2; id. § 2.10, at 5.
"Arising out of" refers to the cause of an accident, while "in the course of" refers to the
time, place, and circumstances of an injury. Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C.
248, 251, 293 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1982). An accident arises out of and in the course of employ-
ment when it occurs while the employee "is engaged in some activity or duty which he is
authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the em-
ployer's business." Long v. Asphalt Paving Co., 47 N.C. App. 564, 566, 268 S.E.2d 1, 3
(1980).
73. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
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The workers' compensation system envisions mutual concessions by
the employer and employee-a quid pro quo in which the employer, in
exchange for giving up its three common-law defenses,74 receives limited
and predictable liability, while the employee, in return for the guarantee
of automatic and speedy compensation, relinquishes his right to the po-
tentially greater damages available at common law.75 The workers' com-
pensation system, although judicially approved as a sound public policy
and as fair both to employer and employee,76 was never designed to
provide compensation equal to an employee's actual loss. 77 Rather, its
intent was to reduce litigation and judicial involvement in work-related
injuries and to provide employees with quick, uncontested
compensation.78
For negligently inflicted injuries or death, workers' compensation
benefits serve as an employee's exclusive remedy. 79 The North Carolina
courts and legislature have never maintained, however, that the Act
preempts common-law recovery for intentional wrongdoing. s0 In con-
trast the courts have recognized that intentional torts committed by an
employer or by co-employees constitute an exception to the exclusivity
provision of the Act."' To define the exception for intentional miscon-
duct North Carolina courts have focused primarily on two issues: (1) the
level of intent required to constitute intentional conduct; and (2) the ne-
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 711-12, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985); 2A LAR-
SON, supra note 67, § 65.11, at 12-1.
76. Barber, 223 N.C. at 216, 25 S.E.2d at 839.
77. KEETON et al. supra note 39, § 80, at 574; 1 LARSON, supra note 67, § 2.20, at 6-7; id.
§ 2.50, at 11-12. An employee receives compensation for his economic losses. Compensation
benefits are awarded for "disability." The Act defines disability as the "incapacity because of
injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1991). Benefits are based on a percentage of an employee's wages for a
prescribed period of time. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-29 to -31 (1991) (outlining
compensation calculations for total, partial, and scheduled disability).
78. 1 LARSON, supra note 67, § 1.10, at 1-2.
79. See, eg., Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 366, 148 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1966)
(holding that Workers' Compensation Act bars negligence action against employer); Altman v.
Sanders, 267 N.C. 158, 162, 148 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1966) (same holding in action against co-
employee).
80. The rationale for excluding intentional wrongdoing from the Act's exclusivity provi-
sion is that such conduct is not an "accident" from the employer's perspective. See 2A LAR-
SON, supra note 67, § 68.11, at 13-4.
81. The Act's exclusivity provision appears at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991). For the
text of § 97-10.1, see supra note 32. For a discussion of the development of the intentional-tort
exception, see infra notes 82-138 and accompanying text. Some states' statutes create this
exception explicitly for intentional torts; in other states, as in North Carolina, the exception
has been judicially recognized. See 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13, at 13-10 to 13-35 n. 1I
and cases cited therein.
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cessity of the employee's election between statutory and common-law
remedies.
THE NATURE OF INTENT
The North Carolina courts implicitly recognized the right of an em-
ployee to recover at common law for injuries intentionally inflicted by his
employer nearly four decades ago in Essick v. City of Lexington82 and
Warner v. Leder.83 Prior to Woodson, however, only deliberate intent to
injure the employee constituted intentional conduct within the meaning
of the Act.84 In dictum, the Essick court"5 approvingly quoted the gen-
eral rule, as expressed by one commentator:
"[W]here the employer is guilty of a felonious or wilful assault
on an employee he cannot relegate him to the compensation act
for recovery. It would be against sound reason to allow the
employer deliberately to batter his helper, and then compel the
worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation benefits,
either from his insurance carrier or from himself as self-insurer.
The weight of authority gives the employee the choice of suing
the employer at common law or accepting compensation."86
The court reiterated its support for this general rule in Warner, stat-
ing that the employer cannot relegate its employee to workers' compen-
sation benefits in the case of a felonious assault.8 7 Although the facts of
Warner involved a potential suit against a co-employee, so that the court
addressed the requisite intent to strip a co-employee of immunity from
suit, it found the reasoning equally applicable to employers.8" To remove
82. 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950).
83. 234 N.C. 727, 732, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952), overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson,
312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at
349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
84. 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13, at 13-10. A majority of jurisdictions still require
actual intent to injure the employee to strip the employer's immunity from tort liability under
workers' compensation. Id.
85. At issue in Essick was the liability of two fellow workmen of the employee-decedent.
Essick, 232 N.C. at 207, 60 S.E.2d at 111. The court construed § 97-9 of the Act, which
extended immunity from tort actions to an employer and "those conducting his business," in
conjunction with § 97-10.1, the exclusivity provision, so as to provide co-employees with the
same immunity from common-law suits that the employer enjoys. See supra note 32 (quoting
these provisions). Employer and co-employee conduct are thus governed by the same
principles.
86. Essick, 232 N.C. at 210-11, 60 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting HoRovrrz, supra note 9, at
336).
87. Id. (quoting HoRovrrz, supra note 9, at 336); see Warner, 234 N.C. at 733-34, 69
S.E.2d at 10 (quoting Essick, 232 N.C. at 210-11, 60 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting HoRovrrz, supra
note 9, at 336)).
88. Warner, 234 N.C. at 733, 69 S.E.2d at 10.
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the Workers' Compensation Act's immunity, the Warner court held, in-
jury must result from an actual intent to injure the employee.89
In Pleasant v. Johnson90 the North Carolina Supreme Court ex-
panded the type of conduct necessary to lift the shield that protected co-
employees from tort liability.91 The plaintiff in Pleasant suffered injuries
when a fellow employee, in an attempt to scare him, drove a van close to
the plaintiff and blew the horn, actually striking him and injuring his
knee.9" The court held that such willful, wanton, and reckless conduct
also represented an intentional injury, thus removing the co-employee
from the Act's immunity provision and giving the injured employee the
right to seek recovery in tort.9 3
The court asserted that North Carolina tort law recognized con-
structive intent as sufficient to constitute an intentional tort:94 "Con-
structive intent to injure exists where conduct threatens the safety of
others and is so reckless or manifestly indifferent to the consequences
that a finding of willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual
intent is justified."9' Willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, therefore,
according to the Pleasant court, should equate with intent to injure for
purposes of the Act.96 The court acknowledged that the majority of
states recognizing similar immunity for co-employees required an actual
intent to injure to remove the co-employee's immunity from suit.97 The
89. Id.; see also Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 545, 114 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1960) (holding
that since the co-employee defendant's actions were reckless and wanton and did not demon-
strate an intent to injure the plaintiff, the co-employee's immunity protected him from tort
liability), overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250
(1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
The view expressed in Warner and Wesley is consistent with the majority view in other
jurisdictions-an actual intent to injure is required to override the exclusivity of the workers'
compensation act. See 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13 and cases cited therein.
90. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985).
91. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
92. Id. at 711, 325 S.E.2d at 246.
93. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250. The Pleasant court overruled Wesley and Warner to the
extent that they required an actual intent to injure on the part of a co-employee; these cases
remained good law, however, insofar as they required actual intent for common-law suits
against employers. Id. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
94. Id. at 715, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
95. Id. (citing Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929)). The court noted that
"wanton and reckless negligence gives rise to constructive intent." Id.
96. Id. Justice Meyer dissented from this holding. Id. at 718-24, 325 S.E.2d at 250-51
(Meyer, J., dissenting); see infra note 99.
97. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 715-16, 325 S.E.2d at 248-49. The court noted, however, that
the West Virginia Supreme Court had held that employers could be sued for injuries caused by
willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. Id. at 716, 325 S.E.2d at 249 (citing Mandolidis v.
Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978)). For a discussion of the West Virginia
court's rationale in Mandolidis, see infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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court, however, rejected the prevailing view and maintained that permit-
ting suit would serve as a deterrent against future misconduct, would
place the responsibility properly upon the tortfeasor, and would comport
with basic ideas of justice and logic.98
Although Pleasant opened the door for increased suits against co-
employees,99 the court declined to consider whether its broad holding
should extend to cover similar conduct by employers."° Little more
than a year later, the court faced this unanswered question of employer
liability. In Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co. 1 I plaintiff, the administra-
tor of decedent employee's estate, filed suit against the decedent's em-
ployer, alleging that an explosion resulting from the employer's willful,
reckless, and intentional actions killed the decedent.1 2 The complaint
alleged that the employer had failed to provide a safe workplace and had
taken affirmative steps to create dangerous working conditions.103
Justice Meyer, writing for the court in an opinion joined only by one
other justice," 4 reaffirmed the recognized exception to the Workers'
98. "It would be a travesty of justice and logic to permit a worker to injure a co-employee
through such conduct, and then compel the injured co-employee to accept moderate benefits
under the Act." Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250. For a more detailed discussion
of the court's reasoning in Pleasant, see David M. Ledbetter, Note, Pleasant v. Johnson: The
North Carolina Supreme Court Enters the Twilight Zone-Is a Co-employee Liable in Tort for
Willful, Reckless, and Wanton Conduct?, 64 N.C. L. RFv. 688, 693-702 (1986).
99. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Meyer predicted a proliferation of lawsuits against co-
employees for injuries, the responsibility for which the industry ought properly to absorb.
Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 721, 325 S.E.2d at 251 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
100. The court stated, "[w]e need not consider and do not decide whether an employer
may be sued for such conduct." Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 250. In fact, the court's stated
rationale for equating willful, wanton, and reckless conduct with intentional torts when com-
mitted by co-employees does not hold true in cases involving employers. See infra notes 108-
10 and accompanying text (discussing this distinction as addressed by the court in Barrino v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 511-12, 340 S.E.2d 295, 302-03 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion), overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233).
101. 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986), overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349,
407 S.E.2d at 233.
102. Id. at 502-03, 340 S.E.2d at 297-98 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 502-03, 340 S.E.2d at 298 (plurality opinion). The complaint specifically alleged
that the employer had designed and operated equipment used in the handling and storing of
flammable petroleum gases without proper inspections and in violation of state safety regula-
tions, and had committed multiple violations of both the National Electrical Code and the
state's occupational safety and health act. Id. (plurality opinion). The complaint further
stated that the employer had covered meters designed to detect and warn of dangerous gas and
vapor levels in the plant to prevent employees from becoming aware of the dangers existing,
had deactivated alarms which sounded to warn of dangerous gas levels, and had instructed
decedent and other employees to continue working despite the alarms. Id. (plurality opinion).
104. Only two of the four justices in the majority decided the case on the basis of the Act's
exclusivity. The other two justices concurred on the ground that the plaintiff was barred under
the election-of-remedies doctrine from bringing a civil suit, having already accepted workers'
compensation benefits. Id. at 515-16, 340 S.E.2d at 308-09 (Billings, J., concurring). For a
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Compensation Act's exclusivity provision for injuries to employees re-
sulting from a "deliberate assault by the employer with intent to actually
injure him.""' He refused, however, to extend the right of an injured
employee to sue his employer in situations involving willful, wanton, and
reckless behavior, noting that to expand the exception so "would be con-
trary to the virtually unanimous rule throughout the country." 106 Justice
Meyer specifically addressed the reasons set forth by the Pleasant court
to justify suits against co-employees for this type of aggravated negli-
gence"0 7 and maintained that this reasoning does not apply to employ-
ers.1 8 Unlike the co-employee, the employer must participate in the
defense of the workers' compensation claim and pay the compensation
award; thus, if immunity were lifted the employer would be forced to
defend the same claim in a second forum.'0 9 Moreover, the employer
would incur greater liability if an employee obtained a tort judgment,
even if it received credit for any workers' compensation benefits paid. 10
Justice Meyer further held that allegations that plaintiff's injuries
discussion of the election-of-remedies aspect of Barrino, see infra notes 196-210 and accompa-
nying text.
Three justices dissented from the decision. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
105. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 507, 340 S.E.2d at 300 (plurality opinion) (citing Warner v.
Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C.
710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407
S.E.2d at 233, and Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 210, 60 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1950)),
According to the Barrino court, the legal theory underlying this exception is that when the
employer intentionally commits an assault against the employee, he also cannot contend that
the injury was accidental and therefore within the exclusive coverage of the Act. Id. (plurality
opinion) (citing 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.11, at 13-4). By contrast, an injury resulting
from reckless conduct may be deemed "accidental."
106. Id. (plurality opinion); see 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13, at 13-10 to 13-35 and
cases cited therein. Describing the high degree of intent required to come within the excep-
tion, the court quoted Professor Larson:
"Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence, and includes
such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, know-
ingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, wilfully failing to
furnish a safe place to work, or even wilfully and unlawfully violating a safety stat-
ute, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of
accidental character."
Barrino, 315 N.C. at 507-08, 340 S.E.2d at 300 (plurality opinion) (quoting 2A LARSON, supra
note 67, § 68.13, at 13-36 to 13-44).
107. For a complete discussion of the reasons set forth by the Pleasant court, see infra text
accompanying notes 186-87. Essentially, Justice Meyer argued that basic notions of justice
and logic dictate a different result in the context of employers. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 512, 340
S.E.2d at 303 (plurality opinion).
108. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 512, 340 S.E.2d at 303 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. (plurality opinion).
110. Id. (plurality opinion). In Pleasant, the court employed this reasoning specifically to
justify its holding that the injured employee was not held to an election of remedies. See infra
notes 183-87 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Barrino court used this reasoning with
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resulted from violations of state safety regulations by her employer did
not justify an exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act."' Citing decisions from other jurisdictions, the
court concluded that North Carolina's Occupational Safety and Health
Act" 2 did not provide a mechanism for disregarding the provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act." 3
In a powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Martin" 4 foreshadowed
the Woodson decision, maintaining that the standard for intentional mis-
conduct sufficient to remove an employer's immunity under workers'
compensation should mirror the tort standard for intentional torts 1 5 -
that" '[i]ntent is broader than a desire to bring about physical results. It
must extend not only to those consequences which are desired, but also
regard to the intent issue. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 511-12, 340 S.E.2d at 302-03 (plurality opin-
ion).
Under § 97-10.2(f) of the North Carolina General Statutes, an employee must reimburse
an employer from any tort judgment obtained from a third party to the extent of the workers'
compensation benefits the employer already paid to the employee. The relevant portions of the
statute read:
[A]ny amount obtained by any person by settlement with, judgment against, or
otherwise from the third party by reason of such injury or death shall be disbursed by
order of the Industrial Commission for the following purposes and in the following
order of priority:
[T]he reimbursement of the employer for all benefits by way of compensation or
medical compensation expense paid or to be paid by the employer under award of the
Industrial Commission.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(f) (1991). If an employer is concurrently negligent with the third
party, however, the court must reduce the damages award against the third party by the
amount the employer otherwise would be entitled to recover. Id § 97-10.2(e).
111. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 513-14, 340 S.E.2d at 304 (plurality opinion).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-126 to -155 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
113. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 514, 340 S.E.2d at 304 (plurality opinion) (citing Byrd v. Field-
crest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that no private action is available
under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act if such private remedy in any manner
affects parties' rights under workers' compensation act) and Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc.,
641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo. 1982) (holding no private action under the state occupational safety and
health act)). The same reasoning applies to state occupational safety and health acts. See, eg.,
North v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 1974) (stating that Indiana's
workers' compensation statute reserved no civil right of action for violations of occupational
safety and health act); Frith v. Harrah S. Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 451, 552 P.2d 337, 340
(1976) (holding that violation of state's occupational safety and health act created no private
civil remedy); 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 65.34, at 12-29 to -31.
114. Justices Exum and Frye joined Justice Martin in his dissent. Barrino, 315 N.C. at
517-23, 340 S.E.2d at 305-08 (Martin, J., dissenting).
115. Justice Martin also maintained that the court should not deem plaintiff to have made
a binding election of remedies by having accepted workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 521-
22, 340 S.E.2d at 307-08 (Martin, J., dissenting). For a complete discussion of the election-of-
remedies issue in this case, see infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
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to those which the actor believes are substantially certain to follow from
what he does.' "116 Using this standard, Justice Martin contended that
plaintiff's decedent's death was "at the very least, 'substantially certain'
to occur, given defendant's deliberate failure to observe even basic safety
laws."" '7 From a policy standpoint, Justice Martin asserted, it was even
more critical to deter employers' intentional misconduct than that of co-
employees, because an employer's actions will likely affect the lives and
safety of a far greater number of individuals." 8 To permit an employer
to subject his workers to this type of danger with impunity would contra-
vene the legislative goal of fostering a safe workplace."19 Moreover, the
goal of deterrence would not be furthered if an employer could insure
itself against liability for its intentional acts. An employer so situated
may choose to make decisions regarding compliance with safety regula-
tions based not on workers' safety but on economics. 2 °
The Barrino majority opinion clearly represented the prevailing view
in this country, that a plaintiff must show a specific intent by the em-
ployer to injure the employee before the employer can be stripped of im-
munity. 21 During the early 1980s, however, a number of other states
discarded the then-unanimous view that an employee must prove actual
intent to injure and adopted varying degrees of lesser intent as their stan-
dard. The courts in these states chose in large part the same standard
later selected by the Woodson majority-the substantial-certainty stan-
dard. Only the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
116. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 518, 340 S.E.2d at 305 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 31 (4th ed. 1971)).
117. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Plaintiff need not show that defendant intended decedent
to be the particular victim or that death, as opposed to mere injury, would result. Id. (Martin,
J., dissenting) (citing Fallins v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 247 N.C. 72, 100 S.E.2d 214 (1957)).
118. Id. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306 (Martin, L., dissenting).
119. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(b)(2) (1989)). Section
95-126(b)(2), a portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, ex-
pressly announces the public policy of North Carolina with respect to safety in the workplace:
[T]he General Assembly of North Carolina declares it to be its purpose and policy
through the exercise of its powers to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the State of North Carolina safe and healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resources.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-126(b)(2). The subsection also enumerates several methods for further-
ing this purpose. Id.
120. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306 (Martin, J., dissenting).
121. See 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13 and cases cited therein.
122. See, e.g., Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 482 (La. 1981); Beauchamp v. Dow
Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (1986); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 101 N.J. 161, 177-78, 501 A.2d 505, 514 (1985); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 615, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577-78, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D. 1983); Reed Tool Co.
v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1985).
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willful, wanton, and reckless behavior by an employer sufficed to strip
the employer of its immunity from tort liability. 23
These courts offered several reasons for lowering the threshold.
Some courts focused on the language of the applicable workers' compen-
sation statute. In the West Virginia case, Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus-
tries,124  for example, the court construed the state's workers'
compensation statute's then-existing exception to the exclusivity provi-
sion when injury resulted from a "deliberate intention of the employer to
produce such injury or death."12 Two West Virginia cases decided in
the 1930s had suggested that this language did not require a specific in-
tent to injure; these cases provided the basis for the court's holding. 26
The court reasoned that the purpose of the workers' compensation sys-
tem was to remove negligently caused accidents from the tort system,
and willful and wanton conduct was not a form of negligence since such
conduct required a subjective realization of risk. 27
In Bazley v. Tortorich,28 the Louisiana Supreme Court likewise
based its adoption of the more liberal substantial-certainty standard for
intentional torts on its interpretation of the legislature's goal in enacting
workers' compensation legislation. The court viewed workers' compensa-
tion as an attempt to create a distinction between negligently and inten-
tionally committed work-related torts.129 Thus, the court concluded that
it should use the tort standard for intent.1 30
123. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 705-06, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
124. 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978).
125. Id. at 698, 246 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1969) (amended 1985)).
The West Virginia legislature significantly modified this provision in response to the court's
decision in Mandolidis. See infra notes 135-38, 154, and accompanying text.
126. Mandolidis, 161 W. Va. at 701-02 & n.5, 246 S.E.2d at 911-12 & n.5 (citing Maynard
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 252-53, 175 S.E. 70, 71-2 (1934) (applying exception
to willfully inflicted injuries if the carelessness, indifference, and negligence of employer are so
egregious as to warrant determination that ultimate intent was to injure)); Collins v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 234-35, 171 S.E. 757, 759 (1933) (holding that employer
could deliberately intend to cause injury or death by act of omission)). Later cases had re-
quired actual intent, but these cases were overruled by Mandolidis. Id. at 703-05, 246 S.E.2d
at 912-13 (overruling Eisnaugle v. Booth, 159 W. Va. 779, 783, 226 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1976);
Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 750, 65 S.E.2d 87, 93-94 (1951);
Allen v. Raleigh-Wyo. Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 634, 186 S.E. 612, 613-14 (1936)).
127. Id. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 913-14.
128. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
129. Id. at 480. Although the Bazley court decided the issue in the context of co-employ-
ees' liability, subsequent Louisiana courts applied the standard established for intentional con-
duct to claims involving employers as well. See also 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.13, at 13-
17 to 13-22 n.11 (abstracting Louisiana cases).
130. Bazley, 397 So. 2d at 482 (citing KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 8, at 34-35; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)). The court held that the facts before it (allega-
tions that co-employee operated truck without horn, in disregard of maintenance standards,
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In contrast to Mandolidis and Bazley, the Michigan Supreme Court
in Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. 131 focused not on statutory language
but on pure public policy. The court cited as a basis for its adoption of
the substantial-certainty standard its concern that employers who injure
or kill employees under circumstances that might result in criminal lia-
bility but in which the employee is nevertheless unable to establish that
the employer specifically intended to injure him might escape tort liabil-
ity. 132 While acknowledging that this standard is problematic because it
is difficult to draw the line between substantial certainty and substantial
risk,133 the court found this preferable to allowing employers to escape
tort liability for truly egregious behavior.1 34
Legislators in West Virginia, Ohio, and Michigan, unhappy with the
judicial expansion of employer liability, moved expeditiously to modify
the courts' holdings.1 35 Legislators were concerned with the effect that
broadening employer tort liability might have on their state's business
and economy. 136 The statutes modified in response to these judicial deci-
sions attempted to balance the interests of management and labor, but
often created ambiguities regarding the standard the legislation sought to
impose.1 37 The general tenor of the legislation, however, was to restrain
further attempts to expand the intentional-tort exception. 138
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Woodson pointed to these
changes in other jurisdictions and rejected (and, to a certain extent, over-
without keeping a proper lookout, and without warning plaintiff of danger) were insufficient to
constitute an intentional act under the standard it established. Id. at 478, 482.
131. 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 893 (1986).
132. Id. at 24-25, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
133. Id. The court pointed to Ohio cases as evidence of this confusion. Id. at 24, 398
N.W.2d at 893 (citing Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 96, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1052
(1984) (holding standard met where employer knew action posed substantial risk to
employees)).
134. Id. at 24-25, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
135. Act of May 14, 1987, ch. 28, 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 92, 92-96 (codified at MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.131,418.301(4), (6)-(8), (9), 418.354(1) (West Supp. 1991)); Act of
May 28, 1986, ch. 307, 1985-86 Ohio Laws 718, 733-36 (codified at OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4121.80 (Anderson 1991)); Act of Feb. 7, 1983, ch. 192, 1983 W. Va. Acts 1039, 1040-43
(codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (Supp. 1991)); see 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.15, at
13-50 to -56; Gail S. Parkhurst, Note, Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act: The
Intentional Tort Exception To the Exclusive Remedy Provision, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 371, 390-
408 (1989).
136. See, eg., Michael A. Mixer, Note, Intentional Torts and Workers' Compensation:
Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986), 4 COOLEY L. REV,
707, 721-22 (1987) (analyzing Michigan legislative response); Parkhurst, supra note 135, at
395-97 (describing Michigan legislative reaction).
137. See Parkhurst, supra note 135, at 391-408 (discussing statutory modifications in Ohio,
Michigan, and West Virginia); infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
138. Parkhurst, supra note 135, at 391-408.
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ruled) North Carolina precedent by expanding the intentional-tort excep-
tion as applied to employers as had this small minority of states. The
Woodson court adopted the reasoning outlined in Justice Martin's dis-
senting opinion in Barrino.'39
This decision of the Woodson court suffers from three major
problems. First, it is likely that the court improperly invaded the legisla-
tive arena. Second, the court failed to address adequately several incon-
sistencies with Justice Martin's approach in Barrino. Third, the danger
exists that later courts will expand the substantial-certainty standard far
beyond the scope intended by the Woodson court.
Although public policy may support the result in Woodson, the
court likely overstepped the proper bounds of judicial decisionmaking
and trespassed into the domain of legislative prerogative. It is well set-
tled that the role of the courts is "not to make the law, but to expound
it," and to give effect to the legislative intent of a statute."4 In discussing
the purpose of and policy behind the Workers' Compensation Act, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged this judi-
cial limitation, stating that although the Act should be construed liber-
ally to effect its intent, the court cannot "judicially expand the
employer's liability beyond the statutory parameters."1 4 1
Not only did the court arguably overstep its bounds in adopting Jus-
tice Martin's standard, but it ignored several inherent inconsistencies
with this approach. Chief Justice Exum, writing for the Woodson major-
ity, asserted that the court's holding, establishing "substantial certainty"
as the standard for intentional injury within the workers' compensation
setting, is both true to the legislative intent in enacting workers' compen-
sation and "consistent with general concepts of tort liability outside the
workers' compensation context."' 42 He reasoned that both actual intent
and "substantial certainty" satisfy the level of tortious conduct required
to constitute an intentional tort.4 3 When an actor specifically desires to
bring about certain consequences, he intends his act as well as its conse-
quences; when the actor intentionally acts knowing that particular conse-
quences are substantially certain to follow, he, too, intends those
139. For a discussion of the Barrinq dissent, see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
140. State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 705, 115 S.E. 190, 192 (1922).
141. Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 190, 345 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 709, 295 S.E.2d 458,
460-61 (1982) (holding that Workers' Compensation Act insures limited liability for employers
as well as swift and certain remedy for employees; thus courts "cannot legislate expanded
liability [of employers] under the guise of construing a statute liberally").
142. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228.
143. Id. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228-29.
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consequences for purposes of tort liability.1" Thus, either level of intent
should suffice to remove an employer's immunity from tort liability
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Because the workers' compensa-
tion statute does not provide exclusive coverage for intentional miscon-
duct, using a common-law tort standard to define intentional acts seems
reasonable.
Chief Justice Exum failed specifically to address the differences be-
tween the employer and employee, although he acknowledged that the
reasons in Pleasant 14 for further expanding the grounds on which a co-
employee may lose his statutory immunity14 6 do not apply where an em-
ployer's liability is at issue. 47 His opinion merely recited that since
Pleasant did not apply, a higher threshold-that of substantial cer-
tainty-should exist for employer misconduct. 148 In Barrino the court
relied on these differences between the employer and the co-employee as
the grounds for refusing to extend Pleasant to employers; 149 in Woodson,
the court glossed over this inconsistency. The court simply stated in con-
clusory fashion that the substantial-certainty standard satisfied the bal-
ance of interests and compromises inherent in workers' compensation
while accomplishing the goal of deterring intentional wrongdoing.1 10
Chief Justice Exum supported his position by pointing to the other
states that had adopted standards requiring less than specific intent to
take employer misconduct outside the exclusivity provision of the work-
ers' compensation statute.1 51 The court correctly stated that legislative
modifications of judicial standards adopted by these states other than ac-
tual intent narrowed but did not abolish the application of the new stan-
dards.152 Although both the Michigan and the Ohio modifications
specified that an intentional tort shall exist only where an employer spe-
cifically intended to injure an employee, both also retained language sup-
portive of the substantial-certainty test."1' The West Virginia legislature
144. Id. For a further discussion of the meaning of intent, see supra note 39.
145. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the factors discussed in Pleasant, see infra text accompanying
notes 186-87.
147. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
148. Id.
149. For a discussion of the reasoning of the Barrino plurality in this regard, see supra
notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
150. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
151. Id. at 342-43, 407 S.E.2d at 229-30; see supra notes 122-38 and accompanying text.
152. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 344, 407 S.E.2d at 230.
153. Id.; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418-131(1) (West Supp. 1991) ("[The] employer
shall be deemed to have intended to injure if [he] had actual knowledge that an injury was
certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge."); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson 1991) (defining intentional tort as "an act committed with the in-
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overruled the willful, wanton, and reckless standard established in
Mandolidis and required a deliberate intention to injure the employee,
but did provide an alternative method for proving intent in cases involv-
ing an employer who knowingly violated a safety code or industry prac-
tice."' 4 Legislators, therefore, seemingly acknowledged that a strictly
construed requirement of specific intent to injure, standing alone as a
basis for stripping the employers immunity, cannot adequately further
the goal of protecting workers from serious employer misconduct. The
Woodson court, although it did not expressly recite the reasoning of these
other jurisdictions, incorporated by reference their rationale. 155
Finally, whether Woodson does preserve the North Carolina legisla-
ture's intent in enacting workers' compensation, however, depends in
part on how North Carolina courts apply the standard established by
Woodson. The Woodson court may well have opened the door to a
broadening by subsequent lower court decisions of the standard, due to
its application of substantial-certainty intent to facts that arguably do not
meet that standard. The Woodson court concluded that a juror could
find that the trench in which Sprouse was working was substantially cer-
tain to collapse and that Morris Rowland knew of that substantial cer-
tainty.15 6 Rowland knew that the sides of the trench were inadequately
sloped. He intentionally chose not to provide his workers with a trench
box, despite its availability and despite concerns expressed by Davidson
& Jones's foreman the previous day as to the trench's safety.1 57 That
Rowland knew there was some risk of danger in acting as he did seems
clear. To meet the substantial-certainty test, however, Rowland must
have known not just that there was a substantial likelihood (a probable
risk) that the trench would collapse, but that a cave-in was substantially
certain to occur. The Woodson court offers no guidance on how it defines
"substantial certainty." Some courts have demanded a "virtual cer-
tainty," '8 while one commentator has suggested that the consequence
must be "unavoidable." ' 9 Can it be said that Morris Rowland "knew"
that the trench's collapse, and the death of one of his employees, was
unavoidable? The court of appeals, in reviewing these same facts, con-
tent to injure another or committed with belief that the injury is substantially certain to oc-
cur"; substantial certainty means the "employer acts with deliberate intent to cause injury,
disease, condition, or death").
154. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1991). For a general discussion of West
Virginia's statutory modifications, see Parkhurst, supra note 135, at 405-08.
155. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342-43, 407 S.E.2d at 229-30.
156. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 19-24, 56 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
159. KEETON et al., supra note 39, § 8, at 35.
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
cluded that the employer's conduct was only "grossly negligent."" In
evaluating the Woodson standard, one cannot disregard the fact that the
standard exists not in a vacuum, but rather in relation to the facts to
which it was applied. If those facts only marginally support the court's
holding, the possibility for misinterpretation and broadening of the stan-
dard arises. Moreover, if courts misapply the standard by permitting
levels of aggravated, yet negligent, conduct to equate with intentional
conduct, the legislatively enacted quid pro quo of workers' compensation
will not be maintained.161
THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The second major issue that the North Carolina courts have con-
fronted in intentional work-related injury cases and that Woodson also
addressed involves the election-of-remedies doctrine. This doctrine pro-
vides that when a party has inconsistent rights or remedies available, a
choice of one is an election not to pursue the others. 162 One generally is
deemed to have made an election only if one has obtained some sort of
final judgment.1 63 In other words, the mere filing of an action based on
one theory ordinarily does not constitute an election, and, under the cur-
rent procedural rules permitting alternative pleading, a party's pleading
may contain inconsistent claims without being barred by the doctrine. 64
When remedies are not inconsistent, the election-of-remedies princi-
ple does not apply; a plaintiff may select one remedy as better adapted to
his needs, but the choice is not final, and he may pursue the other remedy
if dissatisfied with the result of prosecuting the first. 165 The doctrine fur-
ther presupposes that co-existing remedies, if inconsistent, both vest in
the same person; otherwise there can be no right of election. 166 Although
160. Woodson v. Rowland, 92 N.C. App. 38, 42, 373 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1988), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
161. For a discussion of the quid pro quo of workers' compensation, see supra notes 74-79
and accompanying text.
162. Richardson v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 530, 135 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1964).
163. McCabe v. Dawkins, 97 N.C. App. 447, 448, 388 S.E.2d 571, 572, disc. rev. denied,
326 N.C. 597, 393 S.E.2d 880 (1990); see also Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. 680, 687, 375
S.E.2d 685, 687 (1989) (holding that because equitable distribution action was not yet prose-
cuted to final judgment, counterclaims for constructive trust were not barred by election
doctrine).
164. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. at 685, 375 S.E.2d at 687-88.
165. Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Owings, 140 N.C. 503, 504-05, 53 S.E. 345, 346 (1906)
(holding that it is not inconsistent to sue to collect on sales contract and, thereafter, to sue to
recover damages for fraud based on the means by which the sale was procured); see also Wirth
v. Bracey, 258 N.C. 505, 508-09, 128 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (1963) (finding suit against state
highway commission under Tort Claims Act no bar to suit against individual state employee).
166. Competitor Liaison Bureau of NASCAR, Inc. v. Midkiff, 246 N.C. 409, 414, 98
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the primary purpose underlying the doctrine is to prevent double redress
for a single wrong,1 67 the doctrine often goes beyond achieving this pur-
pose and therefore has been criticized and even abolished in some
states.
16 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court in pre-Woodson workers' com-
pensation decisions applied the election-of-remedies doctrine in its tradi-
tional form. For example, in Essick v. City of Lexington,169 the court
stated that when an employer feloniously assaults his employee, the em-
ployee has the choice of either suing the employer at common law or
accepting workers' compensation benefits. 70 In other words, the em-
ployee could choose either remedy, but he could not pursue both. 171 The
court specifically held in Warner v. Leder 72 that receiving workers'
compensation benefits forecloses the employee's right to maintain a com-
mon-law action.1 73
In Andrews v. Peters,'74 however, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that in the case of an assault by a co-employee, an injured
employee is not required to elect remedies.175 In Andrews, a co-employee
walked up behind the plaintiff and placed his knee behind her knee, caus-
ing her to fall and injure herself. Plaintiff, after collecting workers' com-
pensation benefits, brought a tort action against her co-employee for
intentional assault.' 76 Although the court of appeals acknowledged that
a majority of jurisdictions bars subsequent tort actions upon prosecution
of a successful workers' compensation claim, 17 7 the court reasoned that
S.E.2d 468, 472 (1957) (deciding that when intestate decedent signed release and entitlement to
death benefit with mother as beneficiary, and administrator of estate neither had nor made
claim to death benefit, administrator made no election).
167. Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954).
168. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES § 1.5, at 15 (1973). The
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, has eliminated the election-of-remedies doctrine in
all sale-of-goods cases. Id.
169. 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).
170. Id. at 210-11, 60 S.E.2d at 113-14 (quoting HoRovrrz, supra note 9, at 336).
171. Id.
172. 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952), overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C.
710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407
S.E.2d 233.
173. Id. at 733-34, 69 S.E.2d at 10. For a general discussion of this case, see supra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
174. 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981), disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d
364 (1982).
175. Id. at 128, 284 S.E.2d at 750.
176. Id. at 124, 284 S.E.2d at 748.
177. Id. at 125, 284 S.E.2d at 749 (citing 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 67.22, at 12-134 to -
135); see infra note 213. The court also discussed cases from Alaska and Utah that permitted
recovery both under workers' compensation and at common law. See Elliott v. Brown, 569
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because a co-employee has contributed neither to the defense of any com-
pensation claim nor to the payment of any compensation award, he is not
prejudiced by having to defend a subsequent tort claim.17 Moreover, if
accepting workers' compensation benefits prevents an employee from
pursuing an intentional tort action, the courts in effect would insulate the
co-employee from accountability for assaultive behavior. 79 The court
noted that permitting a subsequent tort action would not adversely affect
the employer, who may recover from the plaintiff any duplicative
amounts paid pursuant to the Act.180 The court maintained that its
holding would benefit the injured employee, who could seek damages not
available under the workers' compensation statute, such as pain and suf-
fering.181 The same rationale, noted the court, is not applicable when
the intentional tortfeasor is the employer, who, by virtue of his being
responsible for the defense and satisfaction of claims under the workers'
compensation act, must defend the same claim in two separate forums if
election is not required of the employee. 182
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Andrews reasoning
four years later in Pleasant v. Johnson,18 3 holding that when a co-em-
ployee has injured a fellow employee through willful, reckless, and wan-
ton misconduct, the injured employee need not choose between workers'
compensation and common-law recoveries, but may pursue both.18 4 The
court observed that the same rationale that led the Andrews court to per-
mit both statutory and common-law claims when a co-employee commit-
ted an intentional tort should apply to injuries caused by willful, reckless,
and wanton misconduct.1 5 The court reiterated that the lack of partici-
pation by the co-employee in the defense or payment of a workers' com-
pensation claim eliminated any undue prejudice to the co-employee from
P.2d 1323, 1327 (Alaska 1977) (holding that despite election-of-remedies provision in statute,
exclusivity provision, which contained similar language, did not protect co-employee who in-
tentionally injured another employee; hence, co-employee also outside purview of election-of-
remedies provision); Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 1975) (holding that since
election is not required when third party intentionally injures employee, election also should
not be required if intentional tortfeasor is co-employee).
178. Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 751.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 752. The employer receives reimbursement under § 97-
10.2(0 of the Act. For a discussion of the operation of § 97-10.2, see supra note 110.
181. Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 752.
182. Id. at 130, 284 S.E.2d at 751.
183. 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985). For a description of the facts in this case, see
supra text accompanying note 92.
184. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50. For a discussion of the intent re-
quired in Pleasant to sue at common law, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
185. Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
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being required to defend against a tort action. 18 6 The court also reaf-
firmed the Andrews court's reasoning that the method of employer reim-
bursement provided in the Act reduced the burden that otherwise would
fall on innocent employers.187
With regard to misconduct by an employer as opposed to a co-em-
ployee, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court did not waver from
its earlier view' 88 that the injured employee's receipt of workers' compen-
sation benefits in situations not involving a deliberate intent to injure the
employee precluded a common-law tort action. In the 1984 decision
Freeman v. SCM Corp.,189 the court stated that an injured employee's
only option was to pursue her workers' compensation claim.' 90 That
case involved an employee who was injured when a bolt from the
machine on which she was working blew out and struck her in the
face. 191 Her employer had denied several prior requests by the plaintiff
to turn off the machine because it was malfunctioning, and had instead
ordered that she continue working.' 92 Quoting section 97-10.1 of the
Act,1 93 the court reasoned that because the plaintiff here was subject to
and covered by the provisions of the Act, she could not bring an in-
dependent negligence action against her employer in lieu of receiving
workers' compensation benefits; the Act limited her to an award under
the Act.' 94 The court specifically addressed the implication of the court
of appeals opinion that plaintiff had selected a remedy by stating, "[w]e
wish to make it abundantly clear that in fact plaintiff had no 'selection' as
to the appropriate avenue of recovery for her injuries."'9 5 Since the Free-
man court did not find the requisite deliberate intent to injure the plain-
tiff, its decision rests more on the exclusive remedy doctrine of the Act
than on election of remedies.
By contrast, in Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co.,' 96 the court ad-
dressed both exclusive-remedy and election-of-remedies issues. The ma-
186. Id.
187. Id. at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249-50; see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
189. 311 N.C. 294, 316 S.E.2d 81 (1984).
190. Id. at 295-96, 316 S.E.2d at 82.
191. Id. at 294-95, 316 S.E.2d at 81-82.
192. Id. at 295, 316 S.E.2d at 82.
193. See supra note 32 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991)).
194. Freeman, 311 N.C. at 295-96, 316 S.E.2d at 82. The employee had sought and recov-
ered workers' compensation benefits, and the court found her allegations inadequate to estab-
lish intentional misconduct on the part of the employer. Id. at 295, 316 S.E.2d at 82.
195. Id. at 296, 316 S.E.2d at 82.
196. 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986) (plurality opinion), overruled in part by Wood-
son, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. For a discussion of the facts surrounding Barrino, see
supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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jority declined to overrule Freeman and "numerous other decisions to
the same effect," holding that workers' compensation benefits constitute
an employee's sole remedy when actions involve an employer's exhibiting
other than a deliberate intent to injure.197 Although Pleasant overruled
the holdings in Wesley v. Lea 198 and Warner v. Leder 199 with respect to
the plaintiff's remedies in suits involving co-employees, the court noted
that those holdings still stood when applied to an employer.20° More-
over, even if plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged the employer's in-
tent actually to injure him 20 1 (an issue the majority refused to decide),
plaintiff could not seek a tort recovery because such allegations would
only have provided plaintiff with a choice of remedies. Having made a
binding election to recover under the Workers' Compensation Act, he
could not pursue a common-law action.2 °2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Martin argued that the employer's
conduct constituted intentional behavior sufficient to strip him of immu-
nity under the Act; thus, the Warner holding regarding election of reme-
dies should not apply.203 According to Justice Martin, the Warner court
stated that acceptance of workers' compensation benefits forecloses an
employee's right to bring a negligence action, but not an action sounding
in intentional tort.2" Justice Martin supported his position by stressing
that for the election doctrine to apply, an inherent contradiction must
exist between the common-law and statutory positions advanced by the
plaintiff.2°0 Given the definition of an "accident" for purposes of work-
197. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 510, 340 S.E.2d at 302 (plurality opinion). The court distin-
guished the liability of third parties and of co-employees, against whom an employee may,
under Pleasant, bring an action for civil damages even without a deliberate intent to injure the
employee. Id. at 511-12, 340 S.E.2d at 302-03 (plurality opinion). For a discussion of this
aspect of Pleasant, see supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of
the court's decision with regard to the intent required to avoid the exclusivity of workers'
compensation benefits, see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
198. 252 N.C. 540, 543, 114 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1960), overruled in part by Pleasant v. John-
son, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329
N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
199. 234 N.C. 727, 733-34, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952), overruled in part by Pleasant, 312 N.C.
at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250, and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at
233.
200. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 513, 340 S.E.2d at 303 (plurality opinion).
201. Id. (plurality opinion). Plaintiff had alleged the employer's willful, reckless, and in-
tentional conduct as the cause of his injuries. Id. at 502-03, 340 S.E.2d at 297 (plurality
opinion).
202. Id. at 513, 340 S.E.2d at 303 (plurality opinion).
203. Id. at 521-22, 340 S.E.2d at 307-08 (Martin, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 727, 69 S.E.2d 6, 6
(1952), overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250
(1985), and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233).
205. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 67.35, at 12-154).
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ers' compensation as an "'unlooked for and untoward event ... not
expected or designed by... the employee,' "2o6 Justice Martin asserted
that it was not inherently inconsistent for plaintiff to allege that the hap-
pening was both an accident within the meaning of the Act and also an
intentional tort.2"7 The court could accomplish the purpose of the doc-
trine of election of remedies-preventing double recovery for a single
wrong-by applying the disbursement provisions of section 97-10.2 of
the Workers' Compensation Act.2"8
Justice Martin also presented an equitable argument against the ap-
plication of the election doctrine. Deterrence of employer misconduct,
he asserted, would not be furthered if an injured employee felt compelled
by financial constraints to accept workers' compensation benefits in lieu
of a larger tort judgment.' ° Further, given that the policy underlying
the election requirement proceeds on the assumption that the plaintiff
has a meaningful choice between two remedies, Justice Martin main-
tained that an employee who opts to settle for workers' compensation
benefits under circumstances colored by financial need cannot be said to
have "chosen" that remedy. 210
The most important question with respect to the Woodson court's
election-of-remedies analysis is whether the court properly can assert, on
the one hand, that certain behavior is not accidental or negligent from
the perspective of the wrongdoer and therefore should not be covered
exclusively by the workers' compensation system, while maintaining on
the other hand that the incident is both an accident and an intentional
tort, so as to prevent the application of the election-of-remedies doctrine.
It is well settled that whether an accident will give rise to the availability
206. Id. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Harding v. Thomas &
Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962)).
207. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Many North Carolina cases have held that an assault, the
classic intentional tort, also may represent an accident for purposes of workers' compensation
coverage. See, e.g., Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 432, 53 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1949) (holding
that injury from assault is accident within meaning of Act when from viewpoint of employee it
is unexpected, although intentionally caused by another); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry, 198
N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930) (holding that mere fact that an injury results from
willful or criminal assault of third persons does not prevent its being accident); Williams v.
Salem Yarns, 23 N.C. App. 346, 348, 208 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1974) (finding that assault,
although intentional act, may be accident within meaning of Workers' Compensation Act).
208. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the provisions of § 97-10.2, see supra note 110.
209. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting). Deterrence of
misconduct by employers is relevant, Justice Martin contended, in light of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-126(b)(2) (1981). Barrino, 315 N.C. at 519, 340 S.E.2d at 306 (Martin, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
210. Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Competitor
Liaison Bureau of NASCAR, Inc. v. Midkiff, 246 N.C. 409, 98 S.E.2d 468 (1957)).
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of workers' compensation benefits is determined from the perspective of
the worker.21 It is thus equally clear that, from the employee's stand-
point, an intentional act committed against him is unexpected and unde-
signed, and hence an accident.21 2 Although courts, therefore, generally
accept that workers' compensation statutes cover intentional acts, so that
the employee receives benefits, they differ on whether acceptance of stat-
utory benefits removes the employee's right to sue at common law based
on the intentional nature of the act.213 The reasoning of the Woodson
majority and the Barrino dissent2 14 (on which the Woodson court relied)
represents the better view on this issue. Once an employer commits an
intentional tort against his employee (using whatever standard for intent
the court applies), the employer essentially loses his special status under
the Act and falls within the same classification as third parties.211 North
Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act provides for a reduction in an
employee's tort recovery from a third party in an amount equal to the
workers' compensation benefits he received.216 No logical reason sup-
ports not applying this same provision to employers.217 This way, the
purpose of the election-of-remedies doctrine-preventing double recov-
ery-is preserved. 218 This reasoning was applied to co-employees' claims
in Pleasant v. Johnson,21 9 and in partial reliance on that holding, the
Woodson court extended the analysis to cover instances involving
211. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233; 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.12, at
13-8 to -10 (identifying assault as "accidental injury" from viewpoint of victim); see supra note
41 (discussing the meaning of "accident" as defined by the North Carolina courts).
212. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233 (citing Harding v. Thomas & Howard
Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962)); 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.11, at
13-4 to -5.
213. Most states hold plaintiff to an election if a claim is successful; pursuit of a subsequent
recovery is not barred, however, if the initial claim is unsuccessful. 2A LARSON, supra note 67,
§§ 67.31-.32 and cases cited therein; see, e.g., Marta v. Continental Mfg. Co., 400 So. 2d 181,
182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that filing of unsuccessful compensation claim did not
constitute election of remedy barring subsequent civil suit); Haynie v. National Gypsum Corp.,
62 Md. App. 528, 533, 490 A.2d 724, 727-28 (1985) (reversing order dismissing compensation
claim on ground that plaintiff had elected tort remedy, when plaintiff had received partial
compensation benefits and brought subsequent tort action); Neff v. Baiotto Coal Co., 361 Mo.
304, 307-08, 234 S.W.2d 578, 579-80 (1950) (holding that receipt of medical expenses and
compensation barred subsequent damage suit); Stevenson v. Kollsman Mineral & Chem.
Corp., 91 Nev. 529, 530, 539 P.2d 463, 463 (1975) (stating that plaintiff's acceptance of perma-
nent disability award barred common-law action).
214. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 348-49, 407 S.E.2d at 233-34;Barrno, 315 N.C. at 521-22, 340
S.E.2d at 307-08 (Martin, J., dissenting).
215. 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.12, at 13-9.
216. For a discussion of disbursements under § 97-10.2(f) of the Act, see supra note 110.
217. See Barrino, 315 N.C. at 522, 340 S.E.2d at 308 (Martin, J., dissenting).
218. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. For a general discussion of the elec-
tion-of-remedies doctrine, see supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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employers.220
Another policy used to justify requiring an election of remedies is
the concern that the court will compel the employer to defend the same
claim twice2-once in the workers' compensation proceeding and again
in the civil suit. Chief Justice Exum implicitly refuted this argument by,
asserting that the two claims are not inconsistent.222 This conclusion is
not unwarranted. A workers' compensation claim is grounded in the ac-
cidental nature of the injury, and the employer would base a defense on
whether the employee acted within the course and scope of his employ-
ment and whether the incident arose out of that relationship. 223 In the
civil suit, by contrast, the employer's intent will be at issue-an element
that, by virtue of the no-fault nature of workers' compensation, would
not even be a part of the statutory claim.224 These are, in fact, two dis-
tinct claims. The election doctrine is thus not offended by permitting an
intentional tort victim to pursue both avenues of recovery.225
The Woodson court also relied on Justice Martin's analysis in the
220. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. In doing so, Woodson overruled the
following cases to the extent they conflicted with its election-of-remedies holding: Barrino, 315
N.C. at 513, 340 S.E.2d at 303; Wesley v. Lea, 252 N.C. 540, 545, 114 S.E.2d 350, 354 (1960),
overruled in part by Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 718, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985), and
overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233; Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C.
727, 733-34, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952), overruled in part by Pleasant, 312 N.C. at 718, 325 S.E.2d
at 250, and overruled in part by Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. Woodson, 329
N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233. Wesley and Warner already had been overruled, insofar as co-
employees were concerned, by Pleasant. Id. at 349 n.3, 407 S.E.2d at 233 n.3; Pleasant, 312
N.C. at 718, 325 S.E.2d at 250.
In Woodson, plaintiff had not received any workers' compensation benefits; she had re-
quested that the court hold her workers' compensation claim in abeyance until the resolution
of the civil action in order to avoid the risk of making a binding election. Woodson, 329 N.C.
at 336, 407 S.E.2d at 226. Thus, the court did not need, but rather chose, to decide this issue.
221. See Barrino, 315 N.C. at 512, 340 S.E.2d at 303 (plurality opinion); Pleasant, 312 N.C.
at 717, 325 S.E.2d at 249.
222. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
223. See supra note 72.
224. Id.
225. See Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 98-100, 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1054-55
(1984). The court maintained in Jones that, because workers' claims do not involve the issue of
intent, a determination by the state industrial commission that the injury arose out of employ-
ment is not res judicata on the issue of intention to injure. Id. at 99-100, 472 N.E.2d at 1055.
The requisite identity of issues for operation of res judicata and collateral estoppel does not
exist. Id.
The Jones court, however, also held that the law does not entitle the employer to a set off
of the amounts paid for the workers' compensation claim. Id. at 100, 472 N.E.2d at 1055.
This reasoning runs afoul of the goal of the election-of-remedies policy of preventing double
recovery. The court asserted that a common-law award supplements a workers' compensation
claim in that a plaintiff recovers for pain and suffering and punitive damages, which are not
recoverable in a workers' compensation setting. Id. at 99, 472 N.E.2d at 1055. The court
failed to account, however, for the fact that a common-law compensatory award necessarily
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Barrino dissent of the inequities that may result from forcing an injured
employee to choose between workers' compensation and common-law
remedies.226 Other courts also have acknowledged the lack of meaning-
ful choice for an employee who, out of financial necessity, elects the cer-
tainty of a lower workers' compensation award.227 The common-sense
argument presented by Chief Justice Exum (and by Justice Martin in
Banino)-that an employee in financial constraints may out of necessity
choose the more certain, yet lower, recovery of workers' compensation-
cannot easily be countered.
THE IMPACT OF WOODSON
Although one can justify the Woodson court's expansion of the in-
tentional-tort exception and abolition of the election requirement as
sound, socially responsible policy, and although it can reasonably be ar-
gued that the Woodson court did not create a new exception to the statu-
tory framework but merely expanded an existing judicially created
exception, it is equally true that the making or altering of state policy is a
legislative function.228 The Woodson decision inevitably will alter the
balance of interests within the workers' compensation system, and in the
words of dissenting Justice Mitchell, changes in this "delicate balance"
should come from the legislature.22
9
In evaluating the impact of Woodson, two primary areas of concern
emerge: (1) whether lower courts will apply the substantial-certainty
standard consistently and strictly, and (2) whether the increased number
of civil lawsuits that will likely result from the Woodson decision will
adversely affect the economy and/or the state's workers. In addressing
the first of these issues, one must examine the completeness and clarity of
Woodson. The Woodson decision leaves many questions unanswered.
What level of employer misconduct is required to meet the Woodson
standard? When is an unsafe job condition "substantially certain" to
lead to injury?2"' How other courts will apply the Woodson standard
includes medical expenses and other special damages that would be duplicative of the workers'
compensation award.
226. For a discussion of Justice Martin's reasoning, see supra notes 209-10 and accompany-
ing text.
227. See, eg., Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 99, 472 N.E.2d at 1054 (reasoning that seriously
injured employees' high medical bills and inability to earn wages often results in a lack of
financial resources to support a lengthy and expensive tort suit, thus forcing the employee to
choose workers' compensation benefits).
228. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
229. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 362, 407 S.E.2d at 241 (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
230. See Jay Reeves, Lawyers Searching Old Files in Wake of Woodson Ruling, N.C. L.
880 [Vol. 70
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remains uncertain at best, and, as discussed previously, given the facts on
which the court based its holding, the risk of misapplication certainly
exists.
That courts in other jurisdictions realized this risk is evident from
the wording of their decisions. For example, in Blankenship v. Cincinnati
Milacron Chemicals, Inc.,231 the Ohio Supreme Court stressed that
courts should, in deciding whether an employer knew that a substantial
certainty of injury or death existed, "demand a virtual certainty." '232
That one knows and appreciates a risk is not the equivalent of intent,
unless substantial certainty exists.2"3 The concern of the Blankenship
court was realized in Ohio, where later interpretation of the standard
established by Blankenship failed to adhere strictly to a "virtual cer-
tainty" test. In Jones v. VIP Development Co.,234 for example, the Ohio
Supreme Court lowered the threshold by holding that when the evidence
demonstrated that the employer knew that removing a safety device from
a discharge chute posed a substantial risk to its employees, the employee
had met the test of Blankenship.235 In Millison v. E.I. d Pont de
Nemours & Co.,236 the New Jersey court expressed a similar concern,
focusing on the necessity of a finding of "virtual certainty. 2 37 The dis-
tinctions between negligence, recklessness, and intent are subtle, asserted
the court, and the dividing line separating intentional wrong from lesser
degrees of fault "must be drawn with caution" lest the statutory frame-
work of workers' compensation be circumvented.2 3' The court expressed
WKLY., Sept. 2, 1991, at 4 (describing the feeling among the state's lawyers that although
Woodson has opened the door for tort claims based on a variety of types of employer miscon-
duct, uncertainties exist concerning the application of the court's standard).
231. 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cerL denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982).
232. Id. at 621, 433 N.E.2d at 581 (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
233. Id. (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting PROSSER, supra
note 116, § 8, at 32).
234. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
235. Id. at 96, 472 N.E.2d at 1052; see also Nayman v. Kilbane, 1 Ohio St. 3d 269, 271-72,
439 N.E.2d 888, 889-90 (1982) (holding that allegations that a worker who got his hands
entangled in a machine he was adjusting, without any indication that the employer knew of the
condition or compelled the employee to use the machine, constituted intentional injury by the
employer); Bryant v. Lawson Milk Co., 22 Ohio App. 3d 69, 71-73, 488 N.E.2d 934, 936-39
(1985) (reversing summary judgment for the employer, when employee was beaten and raped
while working as a store clerk; employer's failure to provide safe working conditions raised
issue of material fact of employer's intentional conduct). For further discussion of these cases,
see 2A LARSON, supra note 67, § 68.15, at 13-54.
236. 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985).
237. Id. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514 (citing Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 621, 433 N.E.2d at
581 (Locher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). New Jersey had adopted substan-
tial certainty as its test for intentional injury. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
238. Millison, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d at 514.
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concern that a known risk that later becomes a reality not be construed,
without more, as meeting the substantial-certainty test.239 That these
concerns might be realized in North Carolina in the wake of Woodson is
not impossible.
Moreover, courts frequently have warned of the potential for a
proliferation of unwarranted suits as a result of lowering the threshold
for a finding of intentional misconduct sufficient to establish a common-
law tort action.2' The history of the post-Bazley era in Louisiana dem-
onstrates this problem. After the state supreme court in Bazley2 a'
adopted substantial certainty as the standard, the courts rejected numer-
ous cases that obviously failed to meet the standard but had nonetheless
reached the appellate level.242 The experience of West Virginia in the
aftermath of Mandolidis is also instructive. One author reported that
after Mandolidis, West Virginia experienced a flood of cases resulting in
elevated settlement amounts and high jury verdicts, including the largest
jury verdict ever reported in West Virginia.243 The author also pointed
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 721, 325 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1985) (Meyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that expanding co-employee liability will result in proliferation of suits
whenever insurance is available); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 102, 472 N.E.2d
1046, 1057 (1984) (Brown, J., dissenting) (asserting that changing the standard encourages
every employee to pursue both remedies under facts that only support negligence, which un-
dermines the theory of workers' compensation); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems.,
Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 623, 433 N.E.2d 572, 582 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (arguing that
broadening of standard for employers will release floodgates to a "whole vista of lawsuits,"
each claiming exceptions to the language of the Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982);
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 723, 246 S.E.2d 907, 923 (1978) (Neely, J.,
dissenting) (contending that expanding standard invites nuisance suits which will be settled to
avoid costs of litigation, rather than because claims are necessarily justified; costs of litigation
will divert funds from industrial improvement and will contribute to inflation by increasing
costs and reducing production).
241. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
242. 2A LAaSON, supra note 67, § 68.13, at 13-17 to -22 & n.1 1, and cases cited therein; id.
§ 68.15, at 13-56 to -57; see, eg., Schwendinger v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 451 So. 2d 54, 58
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that employee's falling from a ladder did not meet the substan-
tial-certainty standard); Buckbee v. Aweco, Inc., 418 So. 2d 698, 703 (La. Ct. App.) (holding
that employer's knowledge of oil heater accident more than one year earlier did not demon-
strate substantial certainty), cert denied, 422 So. 2d 166 (La. 1982).
243. David A. Mohler, Note, In Wake of Mandolidis: A Case Study of Recent Trials
Brought Under the Mandolidis Theory-Courts are Grappling with Procedural Uncertainties
and Juries are Awarding Exorbitant Damages for Plaintiffs, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 893, 906 &
n.85, 925-26 (1982). Mohler argued that some cases producing verdicts arguably alleged or
proved only negligence or gross negligence. Id. at 898-909. Mohler noted that jury confusion
resulted from the court's failure to define the parameters of the standard adequately. Id. at
929. For a discussion of the standard adopted by the West Virginia court, see supra notes 124-
27.
Procedural uncertainty also accounted for difficulties in applying the new standard. Moh-
ler, supra, at 909-23 (defining the procedural issues raised: whether future workers' compensa-
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to the potential uninsurability of Mandolidis injuries.2" It is important
to remember, however, that of those states departing from the actual-
intent-to-injure standard, West Virginia was the most liberal-willful,
wanton, and reckless behavior sufficed to establish the requisite intent to
sue the employer at common law24 before the legislature acted to modify
the Mandolidis ruling. 24"
Because an employee may pursue both a workers' compensation
claim and a civil suit without jeopardizing either after Woodson,247 it
seems reasonable to assume that bringing a civil action will inevitably
receive serious consideration. A recent article canvassing North Caro-
lina lawyers' reactions to the Woodson decision confirms this assump-
tion.248 As one lawyer stated, "Things are definitely opened up now."'249
Plaintiffs' lawyers are reviewing their closed workers' compensation
claim files with an eye to uncovering "potential Woodson claims" before
the expiration of the statute of limitations.250 One lawyer in Rowan
County has filed fifty-eight previously dormant claims since the Woodson
court rendered its decision. 25' Another lawyer said, "[I]t seems anytime
an employer subjects an employee to substantial certainty of injury or
harm, there's a possible Woodson claim." '252 This statement fails to take
into account the requirement that the enployer know of the substantial
certainty of injury. Such statements lend additional credence to the pre-
diction that the standard may be subject to misinterpretation.253
tion benefits are included; how to handle present-value determination; the availability of
punitive damages and whether punitive damages are subject to offset; and the availability of
common-law defenses for employers).
244. Mohler, supra note 243, at 926-27. The author predicted that smaller companies will
be unable to absorb large verdicts and that larger companies, faced with similar verdicts, will
be unable to continue to make a profit in the state. Id. at 927-28.
245. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 161 W. Va. 695, 706, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
246. For a discussion of the legislative reaction to Mandolidis, see supra notes 135-38, 154,
and accompanying text.
247. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
248. Jay Reeves, Tort Remedies Have Slowly Expanded Over the Years, N.C. L. WKLY.,
Sept. 2, 1991, at 4. Permitting an employee to pursue both his workers' compensation and
common-law remedies accounted in part, according to one author, for the large numbers of
suits brought in West Virginia following Mandolidis. Mohler, supra note 243, at 928, 931-32.
249. Reeves, supra note 248, at 4.
250. Id. It should be noted that the Woodson court did not specify whether its holding
shall be retroactively applied.
251. Jay Reeves, 58 Woodson Claims Filed by Rowan Firm, N.C. L. WKLY., Sept. 30,
1991, at 1.
252. Reeves, supra note 230, at 4.
253. That lawsuits may be filed which do not meet the Woodson standard really addresses
only one aspect of the problem. Even if every Woodson action filed presents a fact situation
clearly within the substantial-certainty test, an increase in judicial and legal involvement and a
concomitant increase in the costs placed on the employer will necessarily result. If employers
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Given the uncertainties created by Woodson and the potential
ramifications of the decision, the North Carolina General Assembly
should take affirmnative action to clarify the state's policy. The General
Assembly could follow any of several steps to further the goals of worker
safety while simultaneously preserving the quid pro quo which underlies
workers' compensation systems.254 The legislature could choose to re-
strict the Woodson standard but provide alternative devices for compen-
sating injured employees within the Workers' Compensation Act or
permit them to sue outside the Act for enumerated conduct. The legisla-
ture also could leave the substantial-certainty standard undisturbed but
enact safeguards for employers against some of the less desirable effects
of Woodson.
North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act currently provides
for an increase in an employee's award when the employer willfully fails
to comply with any statutory requirement or Industrial Commission or-
der.255 This provision could be expanded to encompass such specific em-
ployer misconduct as violations of safety and health regulations and
other particularly egregious behavior. If the legislature should select this
option, the ten-percent penalty currently assessed in favor of the injured
employee for violations of the statute should be significantly increased. If
the legislature modifies section 97-12 of the Act in this fashion, it might
choose to restrict the intentional-tort exception to a standard of deliber-
ate and specific intent to injure the employee.25 6 This limitation would
serve the dual function of protecting employers against meritless or negli-
are forced to spend more to defend lawsuits, businesses will have less funds to pay workers'
wages, modernize plants, and improve working conditions. If costs increase dramatically as a
result of employers' heightened liability, the state's entire economy could suffer, as local busi-
nesses become financially constrained and other businesses are discouraged from moving to the
state. On the other hand, if, as a part of risk management programs designed to deal with the
more expansive Woodson standard, employers devote more resources to promoting workplace
safety-by increasing compliance with safety regulations and modernizing defective and out-
moded equipment-employees will greatly benefit in the long run from a reduction in serious
work-related injuries.
254. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (describing the balance of interests in
the workers' compensation scheme).
255. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1991). Section 97-12 provides in pertinent part: "When
the injury or death is caused by the willful failure of the employer to comply with any statu-
tory requirement or any lawful order of the [Industrial] Commission, compensation shall be
increased ten percent." Id. § 97-12(3). Several states mandate statutorily increased compensa-
tion for intentional misconduct. See, eg., Mohler, supra note 243, at 931 (identifying several
states' statutory provisions increasing awards where employers engage in intentional miscon-
duct). See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 67, §§ 69.00-.24(e), at 13-199 to 13-226 (discuss-
ing statutory provisions penalizing employers for misconduct); id. § 69.30, at 13-228 to 13-229
(same).




gence-based lawsuits and more adequately compensating employees in-
jured by their employers' serious misconduct. As a second option, the
legislature could modify the statute to permit common-law tort actions
in specified instances only-for example, when an employer violates a
particular safety regulation. The legislature could reinstate the specific-
intent-to-injure standard in that scenario in order to ensure an em-
ployer's immunity from tort suits other than in the enumerated situa-
tions. Alternatively, specified situations could give rise to a presumption
of an intentional tort. Ohio's workers' compensation statute, for exam-
ple, provides that if the employer deliberately removes an equipment
safety guard or deliberately misrepresents the toxicity or hazardousness
of a substance to which an employee is exposed, a rebuttable presump-
tion arises that the employer acted with the requisite intent to injure the
employee required to strip the employer of tort immunity.2" 7
If, on the other hand, the legislature should opt to retain the sub-
stantial-certainty standard adopted in Woodson, it should build eviden-
tiary and procedural safeguards into the statute to protect the employer
against suits not meeting the standard. Ohio adopted this type of provi-
sion when it modified its statute in 1986, by placing the initial burden of
presenting evidence of the employer's intent on the employee.2"8 Addi-
tionally, the statute should provide expressly for summary judgment or
directed verdict against the employee who fails to meet the statute's
requirements.259
The Ohio workers' compensation statute includes several other fea-
tures that North Carolina's legislature could incorporate into its statute.
First, the Ohio courts submit only the issue of liability to the jury; the
Industrial Commission determines damages separately.2 60 Second, the
statute sets a ceiling on possible damages.26' Third, the statute autho-
rizes the Industrial Commission to review all attorneys' fees, 262 and all
awards and attorneys' fees are paid from an intentional-tort fund.263
North Carolina's legislature should promulgate changes of this nature,
however, with caution. Removing a portion of a case from jury consider-
ation may infringe on a plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial.26
257. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson 1991).
258. See id.; Parkhurst, supra note 135, at 402-03.
259. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.80(c).
260. Id. § 4121.80(D). A recent Ohio Supreme Court decision, however, has held this pro-
vision unconstitutional. See infra note 264.
261. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D).
262. Id. § 4121.80(F).
263. Id. § 4121.80(D).
264. In Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St. 3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722 (1991), the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the state's entire intentional-tort statute (OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
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Even if the legislature concludes that the substantial-certainty stan-
dard of Woodson properly fulfills the goals of the workers' compensation
system, it should define with some particularity what the term "substan-
tial certainty" means. The Woodson decision provides little guidance in
this regard. If the General Assembly fails to act, the onus will fall on the
courts to define the parameters of the Woodson standard. If judicial deci-
sions accurately and strictly apply the tort substantial-certainty standard,
beneficial effects will accrue to the state's workers without unduly preju-
dicing employers. Employers guilty of knowingly placing their employ-
ees at certain risk of injury will have to answer for their conduct, and
injured workers will be able to seek compensation sufficient to redress
their losses. If, on the other hand, the courts permit lesser levels of con-
duct to satisfy the Woodson standard, businesses will pay disproportion-
ately for negligently caused injuries, ultimately placing at jeopardy the
entire workers' compensation concept.
Chief Justice Exum asserted that the court's decision in Woodson
was true to the legislative intent in enacting workers' compensation and
to the Workers' Compensation Act's underlying purposes.2" Only if the
distinction between substantial certainty and lesser degrees of aggravated
behavior remains unblurred, however, will the goal of limited and pre-
dictable liability for the employer be preserved. Further, by expanding
the class of work-related incidents amenable to civil suit and thereby in-
creasing the role of the courts in the work-related context, the goal of
certain and speedy compensation to the employee could have been frus-
trated by Woodson, had the court required that the employee give up
workers' compensation benefits to pursue a common-law recovery.266
§ 4121.80) exceeds the scope of legislative authority granted under the Ohio Constitution and
is thus unconstitutional. Id. at 634-35, 576 N.E.2d at 729-30. The court maintained that the
constitution authorizes the legislature to regulate compensation occasioned within the course
of employment; intentional torts are by their nature outside the scope of employment. Id. at
634, 576 N.E.2d at 729. Thus, an attempt to regulate intentional torts is void as an improper
exercise of legislative power. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Academy Iron & Metal Co., 36 Ohio St.
3d 149, 162, 522 N.E.2d 464, 476 (1988) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas asserted that § 4121.80(D), limiting the court to a determination of liability,
specifically abrogates the right to trial by jury on the issue of damages, thereby violating the
Ohio Constitution. Brady, 61 Ohio St. 3d at 636, 576 N.E.2d at 730-31 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
265. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 342, 407 S.E.2d at 229. For a general discussion of the goals
and purposes of the workers' compensation system, see supra notes 67-78 and accompanying
text.
266. Before the Woodson decision, in suits permitted against an employer outside the prov-
ince of the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee had to elect between the workers' com-
pensation or common-law recovery; he could not pursue both. For a discussion of the
development and status of the election-of-remedies doctrine in North Carolina workers' com-
pensation cases before Woodson, see supra notes 162-210 and accompanying text.
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The court, however, resolved this problem by not holding the employee
to such an election.267 The employee thus receives added benefits from
this decision, while at the same time retaining those benefits which origi-
nally formed the employee's part of the workers' compensation compro-
mise. The employer, on the other hand, loses some of the predictability
of limited liability that also constituted part of the basis for the workers'
compensation bargain.268 The employer continues to be responsible for
providing workers' compensation benefits, but must now defend against
tort actions in an increased percentage of cases. The Woodson decision
has definitely shifted the balance of interests toward the employee at the
expense of the employer. This is not to say that an employer should not
be held accountable or that an injured employee should recover only
modest workers' compensation benefits when the employer engages in
egregious misconduct with full knowledge that such conduct will injure
his workers. The policy espoused in Woodson is laudable, and the neces-
sity for further protection for employees has been brought home by the
recent Hamlet tragedy.269 On the other hand, modifying the quid pro
quo on which the workers' compensation system is based should rest
with the legislature. The general assembly, spurred by the Woodson deci-
sion and by the current climate of concern for employee safety engen-
dered by the Hamlet tragedy, should now take the initiative and enact
legislation to safeguard the interests of both employees and employers.
HELGA L. LEFTWICH
267. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 348, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
268. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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